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In its 2009 blue print of healthcare reform, the Chinese government aimed to create a competitive health
insurance market in order to increase efﬁciency in the health insurance sector. A major advantage of
a competitive health insurance market is that insurers are stimulated to act as well-motivated prudent
purchasers of healthcare on behalf of their enrolees, and that consumers can choose among these
purchasers. To emphasize the insurers’ role of purchasers of care we denote them, as well as other
entities that can fulﬁl this role (e.g. fundholding community health centres), as ‘Mutual Healthcare
Purchasers’ (MHPs). As feasible proposals for creating competition in China’s health insurance sector
have yet to be made, we suggest two potential approaches to create competition among MHPs: (1)
separating ﬁnance and operation of social health insurance and allowing consumer choice among
operators of social health insurance schemes; (2) allowing consumer choice among fund-holding
community health centres. Although the beneﬁts of competition are widely accepted in China, the
problematic consequences of a free competitive health insurance market e especially in relation to
affordability and accessibility e are generally neglected. To solve the problems of lack of affordability and
inaccessibility that would occur in the case of unregulated competition among MHPs, at least the
following regulations are proposed to the Chinese policy makers: a ‘standard beneﬁt package’ for basic
health insurance, a ‘risk-equalization scheme’, and ‘open enrolment’. Potential obstacles for imple-
menting a risk equalization scheme are examined based on theoretical arguments and international
experiences. We conclude that allowing consumer choice among MHPs and implementing a risk
equalization scheme in China is politically and technically complex. Therefore, the Chinese government
should prepare carefully for a market-oriented reform in its healthcare sector and adopt a strategic
approach in the implementation procedure.
Crown Copyright  2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
In the blue print of the Chinese healthcare reform (“Opinions of
the State Council of China on Deepening Health Care Reform”) in
2009, the Chinese government explicitly states that one of the goals
of the reform is to make healthcare affordable and accessible for
every citizen (State Council of China, 2009). One of the major
actions of the government has been the expansion of the basic
social health insurance, aiming at a universal health insurance.
Since 2009, the Chinese government has signiﬁcantly increased
healthcare investments (by 850 billion RMB over three years;
approximately 109 billion euro, August 2012 exchange), a large
share of which has been made in the health insurance sector (Stateail.com (W. Xu).
evier Ltd. Open access under CC BYCouncil of China, 2009; Yip & Hsiao, 2008). As a result of this
enormous additional investment, 96% of the population was
covered by various types of social health insurance by July 2010
(Hu, 2010).
Currently there are two major insurers responsible for fund
collection and operation of the three social health insurance
schemes in China: theMinistry of Health (MOH) and theMinistry of
Human Resource and Social Security (MOHRSS). The MOH and its
local branches (local health authorities at the county-level) are
responsible for the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme
(NRCMS). The MOHRSS and its local branches (local health insur-
ance bureaus (HIBs) at the city level) are responsible for the Urban
Employees’ Basic Health Insurance (UEBHI) and the Urban Resi-
dents’ basic Health Insurance (URBHI). The NRCMS and the URBHI
are voluntary health insurance schemes for rural population and
urban unemployed respectively. The premiums of these two
schemes are paid directly by the enrolees to the insurers. The-NC-ND license.
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insurance schemes by substantial government subsidies (to a larger
extent for the NRCMS than for the URBHI). The UEBHI is a manda-
tory health insurance scheme for urban employed people. The
premium is collectively paid by employers and employees, the
share of which depends on local regulations and the age of
employees. There is currently no consumer choice of either the type
of social health insurance schemes or the insurer. In principle,
consumers can only be enrolled in a speciﬁc insurance scheme
(according to their residence status and employment status) with
a speciﬁc local insurer (according to their place of residence). With
the NRCMS and the URBHI consumers can only choose to be
enrolled or not, and not to choose among different insurance
schemes.
Although the coverage rate of social health insurance has risen
signiﬁcantly in the past decade, it is questionable whether
currently the major social insurers are efﬁcient in providing health
insurance. In fact, there have been some critics about the high level
of ﬁnancial reserves (deposit) of the social health insurers: it was
reported that some insurers’ ﬁnancial reserves exceeded their one-
year total premium revenue in the previous year (Lu &Wang, 2010).
At the same time, co-payments for the social health insurance
schemes are still high: the out-of pocket payments (OOPs) that
individuals pay directly to healthcare providers at the point of
service, still amount to approximately 50% of the total health
expenditure (You & Kasuki, 2011). In other words, even though the
health insurers collect more funds than necessary, they neither
lower their premiums nor upgrade their products (i.e. by providing
more comprehensive beneﬁt packages than is currently the case or
lowing co-payments). The social health insurers are also criticized
as not acting as prudent purchasers of care because they basically
contract with all public healthcare providers (in practice no selec-
tive contracting), and initiate very little quality monitoring or
programs aiming at quality improvement/control of their con-
tracted health providers (Yip & Hanson, 2009).
The Chinese government is planning to create competition
within its health insurance sector in order to increase efﬁciency
(State Council of China, 2009). Theoretically speaking, allowing
consumer choice among health insurers is one option to give the
insurers incentives to be efﬁcient and to act as prudent purchasers
of care. In practice, there are several countries with competitive
health insurance markets, for example the Netherlands, Germany,
Israel and Switzerland. In the Netherlands, it was found that the
proﬁt of health insurers was lowered due to competition (van de
Ven, Schut, & Hermans, 2009). In the 2009 blue print of the
Chinese healthcare reform, the Chinese government mentioned
that private insurers would be encouraged to enter the social health
insurance market, and market mechanisms would be introduced
among social health insurers (State Council of China, 2009).
A major advantage of a competitive health insurance market is
that insurers are stimulated to act as well-motivated prudent
purchasers of healthcare on behalf of their enrolees, and that
consumers can choose among these purchasers. Currently the
individual consumer in China is in aweak position as a purchaser of
healthcare because of the information asymmetry between the
consumer and the provider of care (which may result in supply-
induced demand) and because of a lack of information about the
quality of healthcare. In addition, at the time that care is needed the
consumer often is not in the position to compare the price and
quality of the relevant providers of care. To emphasize the insurers’
role of purchasers of care we denote them, as well as other entities
that can fulﬁl this role (e.g. fundholding community health
centres), as ‘Mutual Healthcare Purchasers’ (MHPs) (Bevan & van de
Ven, 2010). Without proper regulation competition may induce
serious side-effects especially for high-risk individuals, such asunaffordability and inaccessibility of insurance, and to a certain
extent inaccessibility to healthcare if MHPs have incentives to avoid
contracting healthcare providers with good reputation of treating
certain diseases. These problems are announced as the major
problems to be solved by the Chinese healthcare reform (State
Council of China, 2009). Based on the experiences in many
settings with competitive health insurance markets, the regula-
tions to prevent these problems should not be underestimated by
the Chinese government.
This paper aims to: (1) raise the awareness of Chinese policy-
makers regarding the possible side-effects of allowing consumer
choice among MHPs; and (2) discuss the principles and practice
(including the international experience) of a risk equalization
scheme, which is a method to ameliorate these side-effects.
The key research question is: How could China solve the problems
of unaffordability and inaccessibility that are likely to arise if
consumer choice among MHPs is introduced?
In addressing this research question, the following sub-
questions are considered:
e What feasible ways of creating consumer choice among MHPs
can be identiﬁed?
e What are the advantages and disadvantages of (these ways of)
allowing consumer choice among MHPs in China?
e Which measures have been taken to address the side-effects of
competition in the health insurance sector in other settings (i.e.
countries) with a competitive health insurancemarket, such as,
Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, and Switzerland?
e What lessons can China learn from the international experi-
ence in order to create consumer choice among MHPs without
the problems of unaffordability and inaccessibility?
Section 2 discusses the two potential options for creating
consumer choice among MHPs in China, analyses their possible
advantages and disadvantages and considers solutions to problems
that are likely to arise. Section 3 reviews and analyses several other
countries’ experience of addressing the problems of unaffordability
and inaccessibility of health insurance. Section 4 considers relevant
lessons for the Chinese healthcare sector. Finally, Section 5 presents
our conclusions and discussion.
Potential options for, and consequences of, creating consumer
choice among Mutual Healthcare Purchasers in China
Two potential options for creating consumer choice among MHPs
As mentioned above, the role of MHPs could be played by
various entities. Government agencies are chosen to act as MHPs in
the UK (local health authorities) and in countries with National
Health Insurance such as Taiwan and Korea (health insurance
bureaus). For proﬁt or non-for proﬁt private health insurance
companies act asMHPs in countries such as the Israel, Germany, the
Netherlands and Switzerland. Healthcare providers act as MHPs or
are involved in purchasing care with various schemes, for example
the fundholding Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) in England, and
different Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) in the US.
Although all the above mentioned entities can become MHPs in
theory, it would be difﬁcult to introduce consumer choice of MHPs
in China in any abrupt way. Because healthcare is a semi-collective
good, constituted on democratically established social rights,
reform advocates not only have to overcome the various technical
problems associated with any reforms, but also have to deal with
substantial powers of veto against their reforms (Immergut, 1992).
If the stakes of a policy program are high, as in the case of
healthcare, actors may prefer to stick to their established
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risky outcomes (path dependency) (Genschel, 1997; March & Olsen,
1989). Because of the sunk costs of existing institutions and
established policy programs, incremental changes in the system are
much more frequent than fundamental ones (Wilsford, 1994).
In this section, we discuss the following two (potentially
complementary) options for creating consumer choice among
MHPs that 1) allow the Chinese government to learn from inter-
national experiences; and 2) are incremental rather than funda-
mental reforms, and therefore seem to be promising options in
terms of policy implementation (Xu & van de Ven, 2009).
Option 1: separating ﬁnance and operation of social health insurance
and allowing private insurers to operate social health insurance
As mentioned in the “Opinions of the State Council of China on
Deepening Health Care Reform”, one potential option of creating
consumer choice is to separate ﬁnance and operation of social
health insurance and allowing private health insurance companies
to be operators of social health insurance schemes (State Council of
China, 2009).
Although a number of private insurance companies currently
operate in China’s health insurance market, they are only allowed
to provide supplemental health insurance products. The social
health insurance sector has not yet been opened to private insurers.
If ﬁnance and operation of social health insurance is separated,
consumer choice could be introduced in the social health insurance
sector by allowing qualiﬁed private insurance companies to operate
social health insurance, and to allow individuals to choose among
the insurers that would be stimulated to act as MHPs, no matter
their public or private nature.
If the Chinese government succeeds in creating a level playing
ground to all the insurers/MHPs, they will face potential pressure
from their competitors. Even the public MHPs (HIBs and local
health authorities) will face this pressure because their position in
the health insurance sector will be at risk if they keep losing
enrolees, though they might not be fully exposed to the risks of
exiting the market. In the long run, only those MHPs that operate
efﬁciently will survive themarket. In this way, MHPs are likely to be
strongly motivated to be efﬁcient and acting as prudent purchasers
of care.
This option has its pros and cons. This option does not introduce
a path-breaking reform by completely changing the role of the
current HIBs and local health authorities. Instead, the role of the
current insurers remains largely unchanged in the reform, at least
at the beginning. Therefore, such a reformmight face relatively less
obstacles in implementation. This option also gives equal oppor-
tunity and incentives for both public and private insurers/MHPs if
implemented properly.
One issue concerning this option is that private health insurance
companies in China are currently only third-party payers of care in
supplementary insurance. They might need time to obtain experi-
ence and talents to be able to act as prudent purchasers of care.
Another issue lies in how the government will regulate the market.
This option only works if private and public MHPs compete on
a level playing ground. It would be a challenge for the Chinese
government to avoid being inﬂuenced by public MHPs in regulating
the market.
Option 2: consumer choice among fund-holding CHCs
Since early 2007, Community Health Centres (CHCs) have been
emerged in the urban areas. CHCs are government-owned (with
a few private-owned exceptions) and funded healthcare facilities
in the urban areas. The primary intention is to encourage patients
to seek primary healthcare at lower costs at CHCs, rather than in
higher-level hospitals. They function similarly to the generalpractitioners (GPs) in many countries. The revenues of CHCs rely
mainly on payments from HIBs and partly on OOPs from individual
patients. As a result of China’s recent massive investment in the
healthcare sector, around 30 000 CHCs have been established in
urban areas by November 2010 (Ministry of Health, 2010). Urban
residents are encouraged, but not obliged, to register with CHCs
that are close to their place of residence. They are generally
allowed to choose freely among other CHCs in the city of their
residence.
A capitation payment scheme, which constitutes an ex-ante
payment from HIBs to CHCs based on the number of registered
consumers, has been piloted in several cities, including Zhenjiang
and Suzhou in Jiangsu Province, in order to stimulate the CHCs
to be efﬁcient in providing primary healthcare services
(Anonymous, 2007). Under the capitation payment scheme, CHCs
are reimbursed with a ﬁxed amount of approximately 40 yuan per
year per registered patient for providing primary healthcare
services to these patients. This capitation payment is adjusted for
patients with 11 speciﬁed types of chronic disease. This payment
scheme aims to provide incentives to the CHCs to attract more
registered patients, especially those suffering from one of the
speciﬁed types of chronic disease, and to be cost-conscious in
providing care. However, this scheme also gives incentives to
CHCs to unnecessarily refer their patients to higher-level
hospitals.
The second option for creating consumer choice among MHPs is
that the HIBs transfer capitation funds to CHCs not only for the
primary care provided by the CHCs themselves, but also for some
secondary care delivered by higher-level hospitals (compare the
GP-fundholders in England in the 1990s). This option is a step
forward based on the current capitation payment scheme. An
important aspect of this option, which we refer to as ‘fund-holding
CHCs’, is that individuals should be allowed to freely choose among
CHCs.
CHCs are good candidate as MHPs because they have clinical
knowledge and are at arms-length from the consumers. However,
there are also pitfalls of this option: 1) the scale of registered
patients of one CHC might be too small to satisfy the “law of large
numbers” for being an MHP; 2) CHCs might lack necessary
management skills, especially the skills regarding managing funds.
These problems have been observed in the UKGP fundholders (Kay,
2002), and led to a reform in England from GP-fundholders to
Primary Care Trusts (PCT) fundholders according to the recent UK
government white paper Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS
(UK Department of Health, 2010). In addition this option is not (yet)
feasible in the rural areas in China because CHCs do not (yet) exist
in rural areas.
Management skills could be obtained by CHCs over time. The
problem of relatively small scale of CHCs raises the question
whether it is feasible to pass the full risks of being MHPs to CHCs or
it is better to pass only partial risks to CHCs. Exposure to the full
risks might also become an obstacle in the implementation of such
a policy. This problem could be addressed by various risk-sharing
schemes and ex-post cost-based compensation between regula-
tors or health insurers and CHCs. In this sense, option 1 and 2 are
potentially supplementary to each other. If the management skills
are obtained, and scales of CHCs grow over time, CHCs might be
able to become independent MHPs in the long run.
Advantages and disadvantages of consumer choice among Mutual
Healthcare Purchasers
There are a large bundle of literature that discussed the
advantages and disadvantages of consumer choice amongMHPs, as
summarized below.
W. Xu, W.P.M.M. van de Ven / Social Science & Medicine 96 (2013) 277e284280Advantages of consumer choice among MHPs
The main advantages of consumer choice among MHPs are as
follows.
First, consumer choice can stimulate increased efﬁciency in the
healthcare sector. When consumers are given the right ‘to vote with
their feet’ and if they are provided with reliable information on
beneﬁt packages and price, they tend to choose the MHPs that
provide the most favourable beneﬁt package against the lowest
price in the market (Enthoven, 1978). Thus, the market share of
inefﬁcient MHPs gradually shrinks. In option 2, even though fund-
holding CHCs are owned by the government, they are still under
political pressure to operate efﬁciently. As a result of such market
forces and political pressure, the healthcare system is likely to
become increasingly efﬁcient.
Second, MHPs are likely to respond to consumer needs.
Competing MHPs are stimulated to meet their customers’ needs
and preferences in order to retain their existing customers and
attract new ones (Enthoven,1978). In the case of China, if consumer
choice is created among MHPs, a likely direct outcome would be
utilising the current huge unnecessary ﬁnancial reserves held by
HIBs to lower OOPs.
Third, consumer choice drives innovative activities among
MHPs. MHPs are likely to be stimulated to initiate innovative
activities in order to improve their efﬁciency or responsiveness to
consumers’ needs (Xu & van de Ven, 2009).
Disadvantages of consumer choice among MHPs
While the advantages of consumer choice described above are
obvious, it is also true that, without proper regulation, consumer
choice among MHPs can have serious side-effects.
First, there might be an unaffordability problem. In theory,
competition could make the system more efﬁcient, and the
average premium will decrease, keeping quality constant.
However, a lower average premium does not necessarily lead to
lower premiums for everyone. In fact, without regulation, there
might exist a wide variance among individual premiums, for
example, extremely low premiums for young and healthy people,
and extremely high premiums for old and sick people. In
a competitive health insurance market, insurers attempt to
breakeven on each contract as competition squeezes their proﬁt
per contract to the minimum. Without appropriate regulations,
insurers adjust their premium per contract according to the ex-
pected costs of the consumers (risk rating), or adjust their products
according to the risks that they accept (risk segmentation), or
simply refuse high-risk individuals (risk selection). If the beneﬁt
package is standardized, risk-rated premiums could range from
less than V400 to 40 000 or more per enrol per year (van de Ven,
2011). Thus, high risks either pay an excessive premium, or remain
uninsured if they cannot afford the premium or are rejected by the
insurers (van de Ven, 2000). Similarly to health insurers, fund-
holding CHCs either pass on excessive OOPs to the high risks or
demand an excessive capitation payment from the insurers, who in
turn charge the high risks excessive premiums. Without proper
regulation, consumer choice cannot be combined with equity,
because the high risks cannot afford the health insurance or
healthcare they need.
Second, there might be an inaccessibility problem. Many coun-
tries with competing MHPs attempt to solve the problem of unaf-
fordability by regulating premiums and beneﬁt packages (for
example, community rating and standard beneﬁt packages). These
measures, however, create the problem of inaccessibility. An
example could be that MHPs refuse to enrol those individuals who
will lead to predicted loss. The most commonly used regulation to
solve the inaccessibility problem is open enrolment, i.e. insurers are
obliged to accept all applications for the beneﬁt package in question(Enthoven, 1978). However, with open enrolment and community
rating MHPs incur a predictable loss when they contract with
a high-risk and make a predictable proﬁt when they contract with
a low-risk customer, which results in incentives for risk selection.
Although straightforward risk selection is forbidden by means of
the open enrolment requirement, there are many forms of subtle
risk selection, such as selective marketing and intentionally
avoiding a good reputation for managing chronic diseases, which
are difﬁcult to identify and prevent (Ackerlof, 1970). These risk
selection strategies lead to market segmentation in the health
insurance/MHP sector, i.e. high risks and low risks are insured with
different MHPs. In the case of community rating per insurer/MHP
the MHPs that are “specialized” in covering high risks have to
charge higher than average premium. This is again may result in an
unaffordability problem. If a ﬂat premium across all MHPs is
required, the MHPs with a concentration of high risks will even-
tually be driven out of the market. Anecdotal evidence of subtle
forms of risk selection by CHCs has already been observed in China
(Anonymous, 2010). As competition gives incentives to MHPs to
avoid high-risk customers (risk selection), it becomes difﬁcult for
the latter to access health insurance or healthcare services (inac-
cessibility problem).
Third, there might be other unfavourable effects of risk
selection. The potential problem of risk selection has various
other effects that are unfavourable for the society. For example,
efﬁcient MHPs who do not engage in risk selection may lose
market share to inefﬁcient risk-selecting MHPs, resulting in
a welfare loss to society. Risk selection also wastes resources
because investment purely aimed at attracting low risks through
risk segmentation or selection produces no net beneﬁts to society
(van de Ven, 2011).
Solving problems in a healthcare sector with competitive mutual
healthcare purchasers
In order to solve the problems of unaffordability and inac-
cessibility, it is important to reduce (if not remove) the MHPs’
incentives for risk selection. This can be done by implementing
an adequate system of risk equalization, which is a system of
cross-subsidies among individuals with high- and low-risk
proﬁles. For risk equalization it is essential to (1) calculate the
expected health expenditures of individual consumers over
a ﬁxed period (e.g. month, quarter or year) based on relevant
information, and (2) granting subsidies to consumers or health
plans to equalize the risk proﬁles of the potential insured (van de
Ven & Ellis, 2000). In a health insurance sector with premium and
beneﬁt-package regulation, a risk equalization scheme can be
implemented to reduce the incentive for risk selection. Without
such regulation, a risk equalization scheme can be adopted as
a form of subsidizing the high risks and solving the problem of
unaffordability.
China is not alone in facing these potential problems; in fact,
many countries with a competitive health insurance sector face
similar problems. Among these countries, 5 countries are selected
for discussion in this paper because governments in these countries
have explicitly chosen to implement consumer choice amongMHPs
and to regulate the competition among MHPs: Belgium, Germany,
Israel, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In addressing the prob-
lems of unaffordability and inaccessibility, it is important to draw
lessons from these countries. Netherlands is the only country,
according to our knowledge, that has explicitly adopted the model
of regulated competition in the healthcare sector and has been
consistently working on this model for more than two decades.
Therefore, the experience of the Dutch healthcare systemwas given
more emphasis in this paper.
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The problems of unaffordability and inaccessibility
The number of competing insurers in Belgium, Germany, Israel,
the Netherlands and Switzerland ranges from four in Israel to
around 400 in Germany. In most of these countries the insurers are
fully ﬁnancially responsible for their business. The exception is
Belgium, where insurers have very low ﬁnancial responsibility.
New entrants to the health insurance market are allowed in all
settings, except Belgium and Israel.
In order to solve the problems of unaffordability and inacces-
sibility, especially for the high risks, regulations such as risk
equalization, community rating per insurer, beneﬁt package regu-
lation (i.e. a uniform or minimum beneﬁt package) and open
enrolment are enforced in all these ﬁve countries. Because the risk
equalization systems in these countries are still imperfect, these
regulations create incentives for subtle forms of risk selection, in
particular in Israel and Switzerland.
In these countries risk selection is indeed widely observed. The
tools for selection differ according to local policy constraints and
regulations. In Belgium and the Netherlands, where basic and
supplemental health insurance packages are usually provided by the
same insurer, supplemental insurance is used as a tool for selection
(Schokkaert&VandeVoorde,2003; vandeVen,Beck,VandeVoorde,
Wasem,& Zmora, 2007). In theNetherlands,where a discounton the
premiumisallowed forgroup insurance, identiﬁcationofwhetheran
individual is a member of a group insurance scheme is a tool for
selection (van de Ven et al., 2007). In the Netherlands and
Switzerland, where a differential deductible is allowed, a high
deductible and a bonus to customers is used to attract favourable
risks (Holly, Gardiol, Eggli, Yalcin, & Ribeiro, 2004; van de Ven et al.,
2007). Other risk selection tools, such as selective marketing and
avoiding a good reputation for managing chronic illnesses, are
observed in Germany (Buchnerk &Wasem, 2003).
Implementation of risk equalization schemes
Risk equalization in theory
There are two main types of variance of individual health expen-
diture: randomand systematic (vandeVen&Ellis, 2000). Insurers are
assumed to dealwith the randomvariation by having a large number
of enrolees (‘Law of the Large Numbers’). In a risk equalization
scheme, the factors that are used to predict the systematic variance of
individual health expenditure are known as ‘risk adjusters’. System-
atic variance can be attributed to two types of risk adjuster: subsidy-
type (S-type) and non-subsidy-type (N-type) (van de Ven & Ellis,
2000). Age, gender and health status are generally considered to be
S-type risk adjusters inmost countries,whereasN-type risk adjusters
may include insurers’ efﬁciency and health providers’ practice style
and price. It is unnecessary for the sponsor (i.e. government,
employers, or other entities that are willing and able to ensure efﬁ-
ciency and equity of the healthcare sector) to organize cross-
subsidization for all systematic variance: only variance caused by S-
type risk adjusters should be cross-subsidized. N-type variation is
assumed to be reﬂected in the premiums. The effectiveness of a risk
equalization scheme is often judged by its power to predict the
systematic variance of contract-level health expenditure.
Risk equalization in practice
Risk equalization schemes differ in complexity from country to
country. Among those with risk equalization schemes, Belgium
and the Netherlands have the most sophisticated set of risk
adjusters. In Belgium, age, gender, employment status, disability,income, mortality, area of residence (urban or rural) invalidity,
eligibility for social exemption, and chronic illness are used as risk
adjusters (Schokkaert & Van de Voorde, 2003). In the Netherlands,
age, gender, region, socioeconomic status, source of income,
pharmaceutical cost group and diagnostic cost group are used as
risk adjusters (van Kleef & van Vliet, 2010). In most countries, age,
gender and health-status indicators are used as risk adjusters
(Holly et al., 2004; Nuscheler & Knaus, 2005).
Of the ﬁve countries reviewed, Israel has the simplest risk
equalization scheme: there, age is the only risk adjuster used. Obvi-
ously, this scheme has low predictive power; and indeed, the health
insurers in Israel are actively engage in risk selection activities. The
insurer that is least active in risk selection, which is a publicly
oriented insurer, incurshuge losseseachyearandreliesheavilyonex-
postgovernment subsidies (Shmueli, Chernichovsky,&Zmora,2003).
Even in those countries with the most sophisticated set of risk
adjusters, risk equalization schemes are not effective enough to
remove insurers’ incentives for risk selection. In the countries
reviewed, various methods of risk sharing are implemented to
further reduce the insurers’ incentive for risk selection. For
example, in Israel there is 100% risk sharing for ﬁve speciﬁc chronic
conditions (Shmueli et al., 2003); in the Netherlands, the govern-
ment shares a certain (and decreasing) percentage of the insurers’
loss (van de Ven & Schut, 2011); in Germany, insurers can volun-
tarily participate in risk-sharing schemes organized by the
government (Nuscheler & Knaus, 2005).
Risk sharing not only reduces insurers’ incentives for risk
selection, it also reduces their incentives for efﬁciency. Therefore,
all countries reviewed are making efforts to improve their risk
equalization schemes and reduce the extent of risk sharing.
However, there are several major obstacles to implementing an
effective risk equalization scheme.
Practical obstacles to implementing a risk equalization scheme
In the countries reviewed, we have observed two main practical
obstacles to the process of implementing a risk equalization system.
The ﬁrst obstacle is a lack of consensus among stakeholders, either
on the desirability of competition in the health insurance sector or
on the necessity of an effective risk equalization scheme. In some
countries, this is seriously hampering the implementation of a risk
equalization system. Resistance may come from various sources. In
Belgium, there is no political consensus on the need for competition
and a risk equalization scheme (Schokkaert & Van de Voorde, 2003).
In Israel, there is a lack of public interest in a risk equalization
scheme (Shmueli et al., 2003). InSwitzerland, the implementationof
a risk equalization scheme is resistedbycertain insurerswhoengage
in risk selection (Holly et al., 2004). The second practical obstacle is
that the necessary data on the health status of individuals is not
available, either because of legally enshrined conﬁdentiality prin-
ciples or because of the high costs of collecting such data. The latter
obstacle can be observed in all the ﬁve countries.
Potential obstacles to creating consumer choice and
implementing a risk equalization scheme in China
There are at least four potential obstacles to creating consumer
choice among MHPs and implementing a risk equalization scheme
in China.
There is a lack of political consensus on the need for competition
among MHPs
Although the Chinese government, in the 2009 blue print of
healthcare reform, declared its intention to introduce competition
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cannot be achieved overnight.
In government reports and statements on organization of the
three social health-insurance schemes, ‘efﬁciency’ is a frequently
used term, rather than ‘competition’ or even ‘consumer choice’.
Indeed, policymakers in the healthcare sector tend to avoid the
term ‘competition’ because they naturally link competition to the
problem of unaffordability. This linkage is based on unfavourable
experiences with unregulated competition in China’s healthcare
system since the 1990s.
Stakeholders in the healthcare system hold various and often
contrasting opinions on a system with competitive MHPs. As
previously stated (Eggleston, Li, Meng, Lindelow, &Wagstaff, 2008),
there are at least six major stakeholders: (1) the MOH, which
represents the insurer of NRCMS and all public healthcare facilities;
(2) the MOHRSS, which represents the governmental agencies that
operate the UEBHI and the URBHI; (3) the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), which is responsible for granting subsidies to the MOH and
the MOHRSS; (4) private healthcare facilities; (5) private health
insurers; and (6) patients. The three most inﬂuential stakeholders
e the MOH, theMOHRSS and theMOFe rarely cooperatewith each
other in making policies.
The MOH’s attitude towards competition is heavily inﬂuenced
by the opinions of the public healthcare facilities, especially large
public hospitals, which often oppose competition due to their
dominant position in the market and the perceived threat of being
challenged by new entrants to the envisaged competitive market.
This makes it difﬁcult for the MOH to openly allow competition
among CHCs (or alternatively, to give consumers a choice among
CHCs). However, as governmental subsidies account for only 10% of
the revenues of public healthcare facilities on average, care
providers are in practice competing for market share and revenue
(Eggleston et al., 2008). Furthermore, the MOF can also powerfully
inﬂuence the MOH’s decision-making processes because it chan-
nels huge subsidies for public healthcare facilities and the NRCMS
to the MOH. As a result of these inﬂuences, the MOH’s opinion on
competition remains equivocal.
The MOHRSS is currently making a great effort to enhance the
efﬁciency of the local HIBs. As the MOF ﬁnances both the MOH and
the MOHRSS, the concept of ‘internal competition’ may be attrac-
tive to both of these ministries. Allowing private health insurers to
step into the social health insurance sector and creating a ‘level
playing ﬁeld’ for them to compete with the HIBs entail entitling
them to the same level of subsidies from the MOF. As this chal-
lenges the dominant position of, and therefore the beneﬁt for, the
MOHRSS, it may be difﬁcult to achieve in the near future.
Against this complex background, the Chinese government has
not yet determined a roadmap for introducing market mechanisms
in the health insurance sector.
Policymakers largely neglect the problem of risk selection
Chinese policymakers often assume that because social health
insurance agencies and CHCs are not-for-proﬁt organizations, there
is little incentive for them to engage in risk selection (Anonymous,
2009b). Although current policies emphasize the not-for-proﬁt
nature of the potential MHPs, this does not necessarily exclude
their incentives for risk selection.
In China, social insurance agencies do not pursue proﬁts but
political achievements such as the number of insured covered or
the ﬁnancial reserves held by an HIB or local health authority.
Therefore, even social insurers are motivated to engage in risk
selection, because the more afﬂuent or healthy their risk pool, the
greater the ﬁnancial reserves they can accumulate, and more
“sustainability” the ofﬁcers can claim.Fund-holding CHCs can spend the revenue that they obtain e
after deducting the costs e on improving equipment and awarding
bonuses to their staff. Thus, even as not-for-proﬁt organizations,
the CHCs are strongly motivated to maximise their revenue and
minimize their costs. The most straightforward way for fund-
holding CHCs to achieve a large difference between revenue and
costs is to register low-risks and avoid high-risks. Without in-depth
knowledge of risk equalization schemes, policymakers tend to be
conﬂicted between, on the one hand, providing incentives to CHCs
to increase efﬁciency and, on the other hand, sacriﬁcing efﬁciency
for equity. In most cities, the problem of risk selection is largely
neglected by policymakers.
It is difﬁcult to implement the ‘English PCT budget’ model in China
In China, CHCs are owned and managed by district-level health
authorities. Most secondary hospitals are owned and managed by
city-level health authorities, and most tertiary hospitals are owned
and managed by provincial-level health authorities or the MOH. If
CHCs are empowered to use the risk equalized capitation budgets
of their registered patients to purchase healthcare, and if these
capitation budgets are to (partially) account for the patients’
expenditures in higher-level hospitals e as in the English PCT
budget model e this will potentially pose a threat to the power of
higher-level health authorities. Therefore, adoption of this model
might face political obstacles in China.
In Zhenjiang, vertical integration of CHCs, secondary hospitals
and tertiary hospitals has recently emerged (Anonymous, 2009a).
Two medical groups, each composed of various CHCs, several
secondary hospitals and a tertiary hospital, were established in
November 2009. However, in addition to the administrative
contract between health facilities and medical groups, the former
are still ofﬁcially owned and managed by various tiers of local
government. Therefore, this kind of integration does not provide
a solid base for implementing the English PCT budget model.
There is a lack of necessary data in China
Data deﬁciency is a major problem faced by most countries that
have a risk equalization scheme or are considering implementing
such a scheme. In China, data on the individual health expenditure
of the insured population has been available since early 2000 (in
some cities since mid 1990s), whereas data on the health status of
individuals is limited to information on a dozen chronic diseases
and around ﬁve severe diseases (the numbers of chronic and severe
diseases differ from city to city).
Another major problem with the data on individual health
expenditure is that Chinese citizens currently pay a large portion of
their medical expenditure out-of pocket. OOPs are not always
recorded in insurers’ databases and can only be obtained from
healthcare facilities. It is extremely difﬁcult to obtain the OOP of
a speciﬁc individual over a ﬁxed period of time: individuals may
switch from one provider to another for different episodes of
treatment, and it is as yet technically impossible to link expendi-
tures incurred by a single individual in different healthcare facili-
ties, especially for OOP and for uninsured people.
Conclusions and discussion
Conclusions
The Chinese government is considering creating competition
within its health insurance sector (State Council of China, 2009). It
is important that the government considers seriously not only the
advantages, but also the disadvantages of allowing consumer
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unaffordability and inaccessibility, as well as potential methods to
solve these problems.
Because a major advantage of a competitive health insurance
market is that insurers can act aswell-motivatedprudent purchasers
of healthcare on behalf of their enrolees, we analysed in this paper
potential ways of allowing consumer choice among ‘Mutual
Healthcare Purchasers’ (MHPs) in China, including the advantages
and disadvantages. MHPs need not only be insurers, but can also be
provider organizations that fulﬁl the insurance function, e.g. fund-
holding Community Health Centres (CHCs). We also examined the
experiences of ﬁve countries in addressing the unaffordability and
inaccessibility problems posed by competitive health insurance
markets and highlighted some lessons that are relevant for China.
Our main conclusion is that although allowing consumer choice
among MHPs presents clear beneﬁts, negative side-effects such as
the unaffordability and inaccessibility problems should not be
underestimated. One way to attempt to address these problems is
by implementing premium regulation, beneﬁt-package regulation
and open enrolment. However, such measures provide incentives
for MHPs to indulge in risk selection, which is a severe problem
because it may harm the accessibility of health insurance and in
some cases healthcare, especially among high-risk individuals. In
theory risk selection can be counteracted by an effective risk
equalization scheme, but in practice most equalization systems
appear to be still imperfect. In ﬁve reviewed countries with
competitive health insurance markets, we have found that risk
selection occurs in practice, albeit to different extents. In Israel and
Switzerland, where the predictive power of the risk equalization
scheme is poor, risk selection is a serious problem. In three other
countries e Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands e more
sophisticated risk equalization schemes have been implemented,
but all three countries still experience the risk selection problem to
some extent. China is not likely to be an exception if a competitive
health insurance system is allowed and encouraged. In addition,
practical difﬁculties and obstacles are also likely to be encountered
in the context of China. Ex-post risk sharing is widely used to
compensate for the ineffectiveness of risk equalization schemes. In
addition, in all these ﬁve countries that operate risk equalization
schemes, political and technical obstacles have been encountered
during or before their implementation. Similar obstacles exist in
China. For successful implementation of a risk equalization scheme,
relevant data at the level of the individual consumer must be made
available. This seems to be a big challenge for China because the
availability of such data is not clear, and even if the data is available,
the stakeholders’ willingness to share such data is unknown. If
China is going to create consumer choice of MHP, the improvement
of the data and the development of a sufﬁciently reﬁned risk
equalization scheme is a major challenge. The implementation of
an effective risk equalization scheme in practice, which is a neces-
sary precondition to create competition among MHPs, may be
a politically and technically complicated issue in the context of the
Chinese healthcare sector.
Discussion
Creating consumer choice among MHPs in the Chinese health-
care sector and implementing an effective risk equalization scheme
may take years or even decades. Three key issues in the imple-
mentationwould be: 1) who is the regulator of the health insurance
market; 2) who organizes the risk equalization scheme; and 3) who
collects the funds. As the governmental agencies, i.e. the local HIBs
and the health authorities, have been intensively involved in the
social health insurance market in China for more than a decade,
they are good candidates to be the regulator of the (local) healthinsurance market. If the Chinese government adopted option 1 for
the reform, the entity that is responsible for ﬁnancing health
insurance (which was a part of the previous HIB before the sepa-
ration of ﬁnance and operation) would be the best candidate to act
as both regulator of the market as well as the organizer of risk
equalization schemes. If option 2 was adopted, the HIBs and the
local health authorities can cooperate with each other and become
the regulator of the market. The HIBs can also act as the organizers
of the risk equalization schemes. The answer to the question “who
collects the funds” depends to a large extent on how the premiums
are calculated. If premiums are calculated according to the income
of the enrollees, it would be difﬁcult for the private health insurers
to collect funds because they normally do not have income infor-
mation about their enrolees. In this scenario, local health authori-
ties or the entities that are responsible for ﬁnancing social health
insurance could act as funds collectors and distribute the funds
among operators of health insurance. Because there are currently
two major social MHPs (namely local HIBs and local health
authorities) in China in basically any speciﬁc administrative areas, it
would be difﬁcult to implement a risk equalization scheme in one
area without intensive cooperation between these two MHPs
(which would be difﬁcult) or combining them into one single
entity. In several cities, there have been signs of combining
different social health insurance schemes into one universal one in
an administrative area. This would be a helpful pre-step of imple-
menting risk equalization schemes in the future.
Given the complex nature of the Chinese healthcare system,
policymakers need to adopt a strategic approach in designing
reforms that envisage a healthcare systemwith competitive MHPs.
For example, in the potential option of gradually introducing
competition of allowing qualiﬁed private health insurance compa-
nies to enter the social health insurance market and compete with
the existing operators of social health insurance schemes (MOH,
MOHRSS, and their local branches), it is unnecessary to give them
fullﬁnancial responsibility in the early stages. Initially, theycould be
given 10% ﬁnancial responsibility, and the percentage could be
increased gradually as they adapt to a competitive market and
master the necessary skills to become prudent purchasers of care
and efﬁcient administrators. Such risk sharing provides a safety net
to insurers/MHPs. In China, a combination of these methods may
succeed in reducing fear-based opposition to competition among
MHPs, and thus smoothen the process of stimulating competition.
For UEBHI, with which premium is to a large extent income-related,
one part of the current HIB could be turned into an independent
entity that is responsible for collecting premium because it will be
difﬁcult for private MHPs to collect income-related premium. The
HIB could then organize a risk equalization system that provides
payments to both public and private MHPs. The current HIBs and
local health authorities are also good candidates to organize risk
equalization schemes because they have more than 20 years’
experience of operating social health insurance and have rich data
about the historic individual level health expenditure and to
a certain degree individual’s health status.
Consumer choice among MHPs may be effective in terms of
reducing unnecessarily excessive ﬁnancial reserves of the current
social health insurance agencies. However, if healthcare providers
are not motivated to compete with one other, competing MHPs will
have little room to negotiatewith them over the price and quality of
care. Thus, the beneﬁt of consumer choice among MHPs will be
limited. In China, although healthcare providers are legally owned
and managed by the government, in practice they are largely
ﬁnancially independent. Providers are given incentives to generate
revenue. However, due to inappropriate price regulation and
reimbursement policies, the current competition is not increasing
efﬁciency. The Chinese government is aware that the wrong
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intention to implement reforms geared to efﬁciency and public
interest in the public hospital sector (State Council of China, 2009).
As yet, there is no clear roadmap for reform of the public hospital
sector, which indicates a need for further research.
To the Chinese government, consumer choice among MHPs
seems to be an attractive proposition (State Council of China, 2009).
Yet without well informed and carefully considered regulation,
unaffordability and inaccessibility may arise as major obstacles to
the socially desirable goal of equity in the healthcare system. As the
problems of unaffordability and inaccessibility are the two major
problems that need to be tackled by the Chinese government, an
effective risk equalization scheme is necessary if consumer choice
among MHPs is allowed. It is also desirable because solidarity has
been a deeply rooted value in China, considering the historical
Cooperative Medicine in China during 1950s and early 1980s.
Theoretically at least, with an effective risk equalization scheme,
both solidarity and efﬁciency can be achieved in a competitive
health insurance sector. However, establishing and consolidating
such a scheme is a technically and politically complicated proce-
dure. Potential modules of organizing risk equalization schemes are
to a large extent a political choice. For example, the choice of risk
factors and their weights depends on both data availability and
political decisions. To overcome the potential obstacles of creating
consumer choice among MHPs and implementing an effective risk
equalization scheme, the Chinese government needs to be well
prepareddboth technically and politically.
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